Introduction
In recent years the role of the business unit management accountant, or business unit controller 1 , as the 'economic conscience of the organization' has grown in importance.
Changes in reporting requirements, and consequently in their personal liability in advising business unit managers in decision-making, are redefining the role of business unit (BU) controllers. There has been much debate on the new business-oriented role of controllers in recent years, and many popular studies and professional articles have focused on this new role.
Most of the findings and conclusions of these studies suggest that controllers must focus less on 'number crunching' and become more involved in management decision-making processes (among others: Jablonski et al., 1993; Kaplan, 1995; Cooper, 1996; Lyne & Friedman, 1996; Friedman & Lyne, 1997; Siegel & Sorensen, 1999; Siegel, 2000; Williams, 2000; Colton, 2001; Strikwirda, 2002; Siegel et al., 2003a; 2003b; Yazdifar & Tsamenyi, 2005; Vaivio & Kokko, 2006; Järvenpää, 2007) . But there are also researchers and management critics who suggest that high controller involvement in management decision processes may not always be desirable (Loomis, 1999; Indjejikian & Matĕjka, 2006) . Many organizations are struggling with the design of their BU controllership functions. The further decentralization of the BU controller function, combined with the effectiveness and increasing centralization of basic accounting systems (such as ERP and consolidation packages) and HRM management, has been highly important in establishing the new business orientation of BU controllers (Järvenpää, 2007) . A better understanding of the various roles of business unit controllers and the organizational and personal factors that are related to the degree of business unit controller involvement in the business unit management's decision-making process will help organizations as they structure or redesign the functions of their BU controllers.
Until now, the attention of researchers in this field has focused on investigating the ways in which the involvement of BU controllers could be questioned, categorized, and measured (Sathe, 1982) . Most empirical evidence in this area is based upon anecdotic study or case study evidence (Bryce & Pierce, 2007) . Empirical studies that actually measure and explain the degree of involvement of controllers by organizational characteristics are not available, except
for Zoni and Merchant (2007) . They reported the following limitations: "this study was based on a small sample -17 organizations; it used some crude measures and scales; and the findings can be generalized reliably only to the population studied here -large Italian industrial firms.
More research is needed for further tests and explorations of these findings" (Zoni & Merchant, 2007, p. 29) . The purpose of the current study is to contribute to management accounting literature by building from the study by Zoni and Merchant, not only examining organizational factors but also personal characteristics of BU controllers. Prior literature suggests that three categories of factors are relevant in understanding and explaining variations in the degree of controller involvement (Sathe, 1982) . The first category relates to the controller's motivation, personality, and interpersonal relationships with management (personal characteristics); the second category relates to management's expectations, orientation, and operating philosophy (BU manager's characteristics); finally, the third category relates to the characteristics of the company's environment and business (organizational characteristics) (Roozen & Steens, 2006, p. 24) . For practical reasons this study focuses on the first and third categories.
The central question of this study is: What types of organizational and personal factors are related to the degree of business unit controller involvement in management?
To explore this research question we designed an exploratory empirical study, which focuses not only on organizational but also on personal characteristics. Based upon existing management accounting literature, we classified these organizational characteristics into four basic factors that are considered relevant in explaining controller involvement in management (CIM). These factors are: (1) organizational structure (hierarchical relationships between the BU controller and the BU manager or corporate controller), (2) decentralization,
interdependencies among the business units, and (4) the performance of the business unit.
From a psychological point of view, the personal characteristics or personal preferences of BU controllers affect the degree of controller involvement in management. Recent studies show that controllers themselves play a critical part in the determination of the roles of the controller (Bryne & Pierce, 2007) . It is relevant to find out what types of personal characteristics can be associated with the degree of involvement in management by the BU controller; not only from an HRM aspect, but also from an educational point of view (developing the competencies of future BU controllers and new accounting process techniques).
Survey data from 119 BU controllers in Dutch multidivisional organizations indicate that controller involvement in management (CIM) takes two different forms: CIM in strategic decisions and CIM in operating decisions. CIM in strategic decisions is positively related to the degree of decentralization and to the performance of the business unit. CIM in operating decisions is related to interdependencies among business units and to the hierarchical relationships between BU controllers and their principals. The personal characteristics of BU controllers do actually matter in CIM in both strategic and operating decisions.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides the theoretical basis for the empirical model, with five hypotheses being developed. The description of the data and the variables of the research model are presented in Section 3. After presenting the results of the empirical tests in Section 4, we provide a discussion and concluding comments in Section 5.
2
Literature review and development of hypotheses
The role of the BU controller
There are several definitions of 'controller' in management accounting literature. A widely used definition states: "A controller is the person in charge of both management accounting and financial accounting in an organization; usually the chief accountant. Also called comptroller" (Zimmerman, 2005, p. 784) . In this study the focus is on business unit controllers. These are "controllers in senior positions who are responsible for the financial control function on divisions or business unit levels, typically operating between headquarters and operating company level and therefore balancing strategic, operating, and financial aspects of control" (Roozen & Steens 2006, p. 24) .
The controller plays a key role in line management and in the design and operation of a management control system (Merchant & Van der Stede, 2003, p. 493) . BU controllers are the financial measurement experts within their business unit and key members of management teams. As a member of the management team, the BU controller can influence the decisions taken by the BU managers (act before the fact). In addition to the BU controller's role of contributing to business decisions, BU controllers are responsible for the accuracy of financial reporting and for the integrity of internal control within the business unit (after-the-fact reporting).
Can the BU controller wear these two hats effectively -one requiring a degree of involvement, the other a degree of independence? Sathe (1982) argues that the answer to this question is: it depends. Many controllers and operating executives believe that controller involvement and controller independence are more or less mutually exclusive. Emphasis on one role makes effective performance in the other role more difficult. However, 'strong controllers' are able to overcome this apparent dilemma; they remain actively involved while retaining independence (Sathe, 1982, p. xvii) .
Traditionally, the controller was at best tolerated as a necessary evil, viewed as a bean counter or a 'corporate cop'. Nowadays, controllers are welcomed into the halls of management as 'business partner', sought after for their business acumen and the strategic perspectives that they bring to the table (Colton, 2001; Riedijk et al., 2002) . Changes triggered by the new competitive environment have created enormous new opportunities for controllers. This new competitive environment demands much more accurate cost and performance information on the organization's activities, processes, products, services, and customers. These environmental changes not only impact the different tasks of the BU controller; they also impact the degree of involvement in management on the part of the BU controller.
Theoretical framework
In this study we define a theoretical framework that consists of two parts: organizational characteristics and personal characteristics. According to the contingency approach each organization is unique, and the potential range of situations in the environment of organizations is enormous (Chenhall, 2003) . We have classified the organizational characteristics into four basic categories, each of which is considered important in explaining business unit controller involvement in management (see figure 1 ). This selection is based both upon the findings of Sathe in 1982 and upon discussions with BU controllers working in practice. In addition to the organizational characteristics, we also investigate the personal characteristics of the BU controllers in our research model (see figure 1 ).
Organizational characteristics
Organizations have various characteristics. In this paper we report our findings from the analysis of the following four organizational factors: (1) organizational structure (hierarchical relationships between the corporate controller or BU manager and BU controllers), (2) interdependencies, (3) decentralization, and (4) performance of the business unit. Each of these factors is important for analyzing the roles of BU controllers because, as Hopper already stated in 1980, "accounting systems may be contingent upon organizational circumstances and that it is a short step from such work to suggest that the role of the accountant is similarly contingent". The main conclusion of his paper was that decentralization was associated with greater interaction between management accountants and other managers and with the provision of accounting information perceived as being more pertinent to managers needs (Hopper, 1980, p. 401) .
Organization of the control function
A BU controller always has dual responsibilities, providing information both to BU management and top management (Simon et al., 1954; Sathe, 1978a; 1978b; Matĕjka, 2002) .
There are two ways in which the organization can design the BU controller's position (see figure 2 ). In many organizations the BU controller reports directly to the BU manager, but the functional responsibility of the BU controller is to ensure that top management knows the 
FIGURE 2:
Figure 2: Possible reporting relationships in the controller's organization (Merchant, 1998, p. 642 (Sathe, 1983; Merchant, 1998, p. 642; Anthony & Govindarajan, 2004, p. 74 
Decentralization
Besides the hierarchical relationship between the BU controller and his principal, the degree of decentralization affects the autonomy of the BU manager, due to the information asymmetry of the BU manager. It therefore also affects the degree of BU controller involvement in BU management's decision-making. A general finding of the contingency theory is that Perceived Environmental Uncertainty (PEU) affects organizational structure (Chenhall, 2003) .
Controllers design organizational structures such that the organization will be able to more effectively respond to the perceived environmental demands (Gordon & Narayanan, 1984, p. 36 ). According to the contingency theory, decentralization is also caused by knowledge and observability factors. Based upon differences in information or knowledge about the transformation process and upon outcome (output) and behavior (effort) observability, top management entrusts tasks to BU management since they neither have the time nor the ability to do the task themselves (Nilakant & Hayagreeva, 1994, p. 650) . Information asymmetry occurs when lower-level managers have specific knowledge about the functioning of the business unit. This knowledge is either not available to corporate management or is too costly for corporate management to obtain (Christie et al., 2001 ). Abernethy, Bouwens, and Van Lent (2004) have found that decentralization is positively related with the level of information asymmetry and negatively to intra-firm interdependencies (Abernethy et al., 2004, p. 547) . As a result of decentralization, BU managers have opportunities to misrepresent information and divert resources to their personal use. Decentralization refers to the level of autonomy delegated to managers (Chenhall & Morris, 1986) . By decentralization the BU manager has more rights to take decisions without asking permission of corporate managers. Corporate management uses decentralization also to encourage the decision capacity of its BU managers, thereby increasing the value of the organization (Wruck & Jensen, 1994) . Findings suggest that attempts by BU controllers to improve response time and to assimilate information from many resources into a broad Management Accounting Systems scope are of particular relevance to managers who perceive their operating situation as uncertain (Chenhall & Morris, 1986 ). The BU manager will demand for more adequate information (support) from his BU controller, so the degree of BU controller involvement in management will increase, which leads to the following hypothesis:
H 2 There is a positive relationship between decentralization of decision rights to the local BU manager and the degree of BU controller involvement in management.
Interdependencies among business units
Besides the degree of decentralization, the BU manager's autonomy is also affected by the intra-firm relationships among business units within the organization. Intra-firm interdependencies occur when a business unit's actions have an impact on other business units' activities or performance. There are two forms of interdependencies: (1) when the business unit is influenced by the activities of other business units (impact on you), and (2) when the business unit influences the performance of other business units (impact on them) (Keating, 1997; Abernethy et al., 2004) .
It is to be expected that the more impact a particular business unit has on other business units, the more the BU manager wants to be supported, because of the relative importance ( H 3b There is a negative relationship between the impact on your business unit (made by other business units) and the degree of BU controller involvement in management.
Relative performance
The most common example of organizational stress influencing the choice of reporting relationships is poor performance. Although there are exceptions, companies with direct reporting to the corporate controller tend to be those with poorer performance relative to the industry compared to those where BU controllers report directly to BU management (Sathe, 1978a, p. 102) . In case of poor performance of the business unit it is to be expected that the control role of the BU controller will be more important. That is because top management will want to know the financial position of the company more frequently or in more detail.
Another form of organizational stress that bears on reporting relationships for BU controllers is stress caused by sudden discovery of serious financial mismanagement in a business unit.
These incidents lead top management to seriously question the integrity of the company's reporting and control system and tend to increase the probability that the corporate controller will be given greater authority over BU controllers (Sathe, 1978a, p. 102) . So, if the performance of the business unit is not in line with the expectations of top management, the involvement of the BU controllers in management decisions will be less. However, if the performance of the business unit is in line with the budget or the expectations of top management, or if the business unit performs relatively well, the tendency will be to decentralize more responsibilities to BU managers and/or to decrease the frequency of reporting. The BU manager is thus expected to involve the BU controller more. Therefore the following hypothesis will be tested:
There is a positive relationship between the relative performance of the business unit and the degree of BU controller involvement in management.
Personal characteristics
According to Roozen and Steens (2006) , controllers must take into account the fact that BU managers generally score higher than non-executives in terms of intelligence, dominance, selfconfidence, energy, perseverance, and knowledge of the task for which they are responsible.
Personal characteristics, however, do not make BU managers effective; what matters is how these characteristics influence their behavior. Leadership is a form of organized problemsolving: achieving organizational goals by influencing the actions of others. Given the fact that BU controllers have the same goal as their managers, i.e. influencing their BU managers to ensure that the financial and economic interests of decisions are adequately taken into account, this aspect of BU managers makes the job of BU controllers especially difficult: the BU controller ends up taking on experts in exercising influence! (Roozen & Steens, 2006, p. 102) .
For an effective collaboration and a smooth working relationship, BU controllers must adapt their behavior to the management style of their BU managers. Besides insight into management style, BU controllers must be aware which of their own behavior is best suited to the situation. BU controllers find themselves in a somewhat subordinated position vis-à-vis BU managers. They continuously have to weigh the pros and cons of loyalty to group control (control role) on the one hand and to BU management (support role) on the other. As soon as a position of trust is achieved, BU managers will also be prepared to a degree to adapt their own behavior to their BU controller's (Roozen & Steens, 2006, p. 105 ).
There are many ways to analyze or describe the personal characteristics of human beings (Digman, 1990) . Over the years personality theories have been introduced that try to reduce personality characteristics to a small number of predispositions. This has resulted in the increasingly prominent Five Factor Model (Mahony & Stasson, 2005) . While not accepted universally, this Big-Five Framework does enjoy considerable support and has become the most widely used and extensively researched model of personality. The Five Factor Model is a hierarchical model of personality traits with five factors, which represents personality at the broadest level of abstraction. The Big-Five Framework suggests that most individual differences in human personality can be classified into five broad, empirically derived domains (Howard & Howard, 1993 , 1995 Gosling et al., 2003, p. 506) . These domains are: Openness to new experience (the Originality Factor); Conscientiousness (the Consolidation Factor);
Extraversion; Agreeableness (the Accommodation Factor); and Neuroticism (also the Emotional Instability Factor) (Howard & Howard, 2001 ). Other researchers have developed this model further (Gosling et al., 2003) . These five domains, which are used in this study, are described in greater detail below: 
Conscientiousness (Consolidation):
This aspect refers to the degree to which a person pushes towards reaching goals at work. People with a high consolidation (C+) tend toward goals in an industrious, disciplined, and dependable fashion (focused). The definition of conscientiousness includes a number of different aspects: competence, order, dutifulness, striving for achievement, self-discipline, and deliberation (Clarke & Robertson, 2005) . A further aspect of conscientiousness, related to deliberation and order, is reflected in thoroughness in decision-making style. Low thoroughness is characterized by a lack of forward planning, absence of a logical or systematic approach to decision-making, and inadequate cost-benefit analysis and contingency planning (Clarke & Robertson, 2005 (Mahony & Stasson, 2005) . Persons with a low degree of extraversion (E-) are characterized by a preference to work alone; they are often described as quiet, serious, and private persons. These persons for whom extraversion is below average (labeled as Introverts) presumably have fewer social interactions with other people (Mahony & Stasson, 2005) .
Agreeableness (Accommodation):
This aspect refers to the social skills component and the degree to which we defer to others. High accommodation (A+) describes persons who are eager to cooperate and who tend to relate to others in being tolerant, agreeable, and accepting (adapters). They generally dislike or avoid conflicts. People with low accommodation (A-) may not accept information without checking; they come across to others as hostile, rude, and self-centered; they are not team players.
They keep their distance and do not give confidence unreservedly (challengers).
Neuroticism (Need for Stability):
This aspect refers to the degree to which a person responds to stressful circumstances. More resilient persons (N-) generally react in a calm, steady, and secure way. They tend to be more rational at work than most people, and they appear rather impervious to what is going on around them. They generally act on facts rather than on emotions or feelings. At the other extreme of the need-forstability continuum are the more reactive persons (N+), who tend to be insecure and to react in an alert, concerned, attentive, or excitable way. They feel less able to cope with stress or stressful circumstances. In the middle we find responsive persons; they possess a mixture of the characteristics of the resilient and reactive people. H 5b Low scores on Neuroticism (resilient) or high scores on Conscientiousness (focused) are negatively related with the degree of BU controller involvement in management.
Control variables
The test for this study also includes two control variables: firm size and firm industry.
Firm Size
The relationship between the two roles of BU controllers and the size of the organization is difficult to predict. On the one hand, the larger the organization (firm size), the more business units the corporate organization is likely to have. Corporate management will want to be well informed and will thus ask for reports more frequently. On the other hand, the larger the company the more likely that it will be decentralized, which results in more local decisions. So the BU manager will need more support if the organization is larger. It may be assumed that the size of the organization will have an enhancing effect upon the degree to which the BU manager will need to be involved in management or upon the degree in which corporate management will need reports.
Firm Industry
The distribution of BU controller tasks over his support and control roles will depend upon the type of industry that the organization belongs to. We will include some dummy variables for several types of industries in order to standardize for the effects of firm industry. Table 1 summarizes our expectations of all relationships between the selected variables and the degree of controller involvement in management for hypotheses 1 through 5. Low on Neuroticism, Conscientiousness - Table 1 : predictive effects investigated in this study: summary of hypotheses 1 through 5.
Summary of hypothesis and Theoretical Framework

Research Methodology
Description of sample
The data for this paper were collected through structured interviews held by 29 Master students in Controlling, using a questionnaire survey. These students approached business unit controllers within their own networks. The respondents all work as BU controllers in a business unit which complies with two conditions: (1) the BU manager of the business unit has a profit or result responsibility and reports to corporate headquarters or division (= organization); and (2) at least 50 full-time equivalents (employees) work within the business unit. The reason for setting a minimum size for the business unit is that BU managers may have sufficient decision rights. In total 119 questionnaires were completed by different BU controllers working within 77 organizations or firms.
Variable instruments
In this section we discuss in turn the measurement of the constructs. The original questionnaire contains more instruments than the variables discussed in this paper. A copy of all relevant questions from the questionnaire is attached to this paper as appendix A.
Dependent variables
The dependent variable we want to analyze is Controller Involvement in Management (CIM).
The degree of BU controller involvement in management has been measured through prior research in various ways, such as time spent, activities or influence. In this paper, the degree of the BU controller involvement in management is measured by an instrument taken from previous literature by Matjĕka (2002) . This instrument has been developed later and used by other researchers (Maas, 2006) .
Controller involvement in management by the BU controller
This instrument investigates the influence of the BU controller on two types of activities: (a) operating activities (with impact within one year, such as accounts receivable, inventory, operating expenses, and capital expenses) and (b) more strategic decisions (with impact over two years or more, such as incentive systems, targeted customer segments, and the product or service offering). The measurement uses a five-point Likert scale (1 = no influence, 5 = strong influence).
Involvement (INVOLVED) and the STRATDEC and OPERDEC factors
The first variable is INVOLVED. This is the sum of all questions about the influence of the BU controller on operating and strategic activities regarding management decisions. This 
Independent variables
The independent variables that are used in the linear regression equations are the following.
Hierarchical Structure (CORPCNTR and MGRBOSS)
Respondents were asked to indicate who their direct principal is: the BU manager or the corporate controller. In most cases (54) 
Decentralization (DECENTR)
This instrument is taken from Abernethy, Bouwens, and Van Lent (2004) . They measure five questions: who can make decisions (your business unit or the corporate organization) in Strategy, Investment, Marketing, Internal Processes, and Human Resources, ranging from 1 = 100% Business Unit to 5 = 100% Corporate. These questions are reversed (reverse code = 6 minus score) and then factorized. The factor analyses show just one factor, DECENTR, which explains 46.2% of the variance. The Cronbach alpha of DECENTR is 0.71.
Interdependencies (IMPATHEM and IMPAYOU)
This instrument is also derived from Abernethy, Bouwens, and The factor analyses on these questions measure just one factor, PERFORM, which explains 56.7% of the variance. The Cronbach alpha of PERFORM is 0.85.
Personal Characteristics
There are many ways of measuring the Five Factor Model personality characteristics (Howard & Howard, 1995) 
Control Variables
In addition to the independent and dependent variables, we added control variables to the questionnaire. These control variables are Firm Size and three Dummy indicators for various types of Industry.
Firm Size (LOGSIZE)
There are several ways in which the size of the organization can be measured and implemented in the research model. As a proxy for the size of the organization we selected the logarithm of the number of employees within the organization. Matĕjka also used this variable as a control variable in his dissertation (Matĕjka, 2002, p. 13 
Industry (SERVICE, FINSERVI, PUBLIC)
Types of Industry were measured by codes. In the questionnaire the respondents could indicate which industry their business unit falls under. The number of codes was set to 17.
Based upon the number of organizations in the data set, we limited the number of codes to just four categories: (1) manufacturing organizations, codes 1 to 6, (2) financial intermediation, code 10, (3) service organizations in trade, codes 7, 8, 9, and 11, and (4) public sector, codes 12 to 15. The numbers of these codes are sourced from the list in Appendix A.
Results
Descriptive Statistics
The BU controllers who were interviewed work in various sectors of industry: 47.9% in the manufacturing industry, 28.6% in services, 16.0% in financial services, and 5.9% in not-for- Tables 2 and 4 present descriptive statistics for all dependent and independent variables in the estimation models described in the sections below. STRATDEC and OPERDEC are variables that have been factorized. Table 3 shows the Factor Loadings of the two independent variables: STRATDEC, which indicate the CIM in strategic decisions, and OPERDEC, which indicate the CIM in operating decisions. These variables have mean zero and standard deviations equal to 1 (see table 2 ). However, when the BU controllers were asked which of the activities they can actually influence, they answered on average that they can influence operating activities (mean 3.270) more than strategic activities (mean 2.421). These scores differ significantly from each other according to the MannWhitney test (Mann-Whitney U = 3322.5, Z = -6.766, p = 0.000), and Kolmogorov-Smirnov test (2-tailed Z = 3.072, p = 0.000). (16%) in the financial services sector, and 7 (6%) in the public sector. Except for 2 (1%) missing items, the other 57 firms (48%) are active in the manufacturing sector. 
Main Findings
Empirical testing of the hypothesis derived earlier involved assessing the impact of the consistency factors on the support and control roles of the BU controller. To estimate the impact of the contextual factors, the following empirical model is defined: ε i = error term of organization i. Table 7 presents the results of the regression analysis of the overall involvement in management by the BU controller (INVOLVED). Table 7 shows that the involvement of BU controllers in management decisions relates positively to extraversion on the part of the BU controller and relates negatively to the types of industry: services, financial services, and public sector versus manufacturing. If the BU controller is extravert, the BU controller is more involved in management decisions than when the BU controller has a less extravert attitude (0.056, p = 0.085). BU controller involvement in management in industries other than manufacturing is less than in the manufacturing industry.
Unfortunately the overall involvement is not significantly related with the other variables (e.g. Factor analysis on all relevant questions regarding controller involvement shows that the instrument INVOLVED consists of two factors. All BU controllers have influence on operating decisions, but not all BU controllers have influence on strategic decisions. We therefore analyzed these two factors separately. Table 8 shows the results of the STRATDEC factor (influence on strategic decisions), and Table 9 shows those of the OPERDEC factor (influence on operating decisions). Table 8 Table 9 presents the results of the regression analysis of the BU controller CIM in operating decisions by BU management. The R-squared coefficient of this regression equation is 0.406.
The F-test indicates that this equation is better estimated than the equations of tables 6, 7, and 8 (F = 4.095, p = 0.000). Table 9 shows that BU controllers who indicate that they have only hierarchical relationships to their BU managers have less impact on operating decisions within the business unit The control variables for the types of industry impact the regression estimates. The results in table 9 indicate that if the company is active in financial services or other services or the public sector, the BU controller will then have less impact on operating decisions in the business unit than companies, which are active in the manufacturing industry (these coefficients are all negative and significantly different form zero). The first conclusion to be drawn from the data analyses is that CIM consists of two factors:
CIM in strategic decisions and CIM in operating decisions. CIM in operating decisions is different from CIM in strategic decisions. This is no surprise, because it is similar to the results from the study by Zoni and Merchant in 2007 , who studied the relationship between the degree of involvement and organizational characteristics within 17 large Italian industrial firms (Zoni & Merchant, 2007) .
The purpose of this study is to contribute to management accounting literature by building from the study by Zoni and Merchant, not only examining organizational factors but relating the degrees of CIM in both strategic and operating decisions to two of the three categories of factors developed by Sathe in 1982: (1) factors related to the characteristics of the company's environment and business, and (2) factors related to the controller's motivation and personality (Sathe, 1982) . Results of this research show that these two categories both influence the degree of BU controller involvement in management.
Data analyses show that CIM in strategic decisions is positively related to the organizational factors decentralization and business unit performance. This means that, if the business unit's performance is better than (or in line with) last year's performance, there will be more decentralization of strategic decisions to BU managers, and/or that BU managers invite their BU controllers to participate more in their strategic decisions. However, when the financial situation is poor, BU controllers are likely to be less involved in strategic decisions, because strategic issue decisions will then be taken by top management, reflecting greater centralization.
CIM in operating decisions is related to several factors pertaining to the characteristics of the company's environment and business, as follows.
• First, the hierarchical relationships with the corporate controller and the BU manager were tested. The way the BU controller is supervised seems to affect the degree of CIM in operating decisions. In both the case of hierarchical relationships with the corporate controller and with the BU manager, the CIM in operating decisions will be less.
Hypothesis 1a was confirmed, but the outcome of the test of hypothesis 1b was not as expected. A possible reason for this negative relationship is that, when the BU manager is the principal (both hierarchical and functional), the BU controller may perceive having less influence on operating decisions.
• Second, the expected positive relation between CIM in operating decisions and decentralization is not confirmed by the data analyses. Giving a BU manager greater responsibilities will positively affect CIM in strategic decisions but seems to have no effect on CIM in operating decisions. Hypothesis 2 is thus partly accepted.
• Third, the relationships between two factors of Interdependencies -the impact on other business units (IMPATHEM) and the impact from other business units on the performance of the business unit (IMPAYOU) -were tested. CIM in operating decisions is positively influenced by the impact on other business units (IMPATHEM) and negatively influenced by the impact of other business units (IMPAYOU), as expected in hypotheses 3a and 3b.
• Finally, solid performance seems unassociated with CIM in operating decisions, but it does affect CIM in the strategic decisions of the business unit. Hypothesis 4 is thus only partly accepted.
The second category of factors is the 'personal characteristics' category. Here several factors or 'personal characteristics' were also measured and interrelated with the degree of BU controller involvement in management. As expected, BU controllers who are extravert, are more involved in strategic decision-making processes, and BU controllers who are 'open to new experiences' are more involved in BU management's operating decisions. BU controllers with an agreeable character are less involved in BU management's operating decisions, which is different than expected. BU managers seem to prefer BU controllers who do not automatically accept the work of others, or they will put their trust in BU controllers with a low accommodation level, who will not readily accept information without checking. Hypothesis 5a was thus partly accepted. Perhaps BU managers are more willing to involve BU controllers with personal characteristics that fit with their own personal characteristics. The personal characteristics N-and C+ were not negatively related to CIM in a significant way, so hypothesis 5b was not confirmed by the data. Although the instrument, which we used to measure the personal characteristics, is relatively simple and as adequate as more comprehensive instruments available in literature, the scores of the personal characteristics were perhaps a little biased caused by social desirable answers in face to face interviews.
Extra control variables, such as the size of the organization and types of industry, do have strong impact on the degree of BU controller involvement in management of operating decisions. BU controllers in the services, financial service, or public sectors are less involved in operating decisions than BU controllers working in the manufacturing sector.
Limitations
Several steps were taken to limit the scope of this study and to keep this project manageable.
First, only Dutch organizations and their domestic business units are included in this investigation. Second, the study is limited to a homogeneous group of large, multidivisional organizations. Data selected in another country or under other circumstances could lead to other results. Third, the BU controllers who are interviewed all belong to the networks of the students, so the sample of organizations used for this study is not totally random. Whether these findings generalize to other populations of firms or other circumstances should be explored in future research. Fourth, the instrument of the variable Decentralization contains more strategic than operating issues. Perhaps there is such a thing as operating decentralization, which differs from strategic decentralization. Because of the Decentralization instrument used, the distinction between strategic and operating decentralization is not measured in the data, which could affect the results. Finally, the second category of factors, developed by Sathe (1982) , related to management's expectations, orientation, and operating philosophy, was not taken into account in this study, because this is the first (exploratory) study in the Netherlands. Follow-up studies will include the perception of BU managers or corporate controllers, although it is difficult to manage both interviews with BU controllers and their BU managers. Despite these limitations in method, however, these results provide some useful contributions, including both support of prior findings (Zoni & Merchant, 2007) and the discovery of some new findings that can lead to knowledge modifications and extensions in future research.
Future research
This study investigates BU controllers only. To measure BU controller involvement in management more accurately, BU managers should also participate in a future study. The performance of BU controllers is influenced not only by their managers, but also by the manner in which BU controllers succeed in influencing and/or persuading their managers (Roozen & Steens, 2006, p. 101) . In future studies data from both BU controllers and their BU managers will be collected to explore the third category of factors, developed by Sathe (1982) , those related to management's expectations, orientation, and operating philosophy.
Besides the search for other relevant organizational factors, such as perceived environmental uncertainty (PEU) or personal characteristics of the BU manager, also other questions could be relevant to investigate in future research: for instance, the question whether controllers are selected for their jobs based upon their personal characteristics or whether they shape their job and adjust their tasks to their personal characteristics.
Future research could probably provide better results if the instruments by which the degree of controller involvement in management is measured were to improve. Measuring the variables of BU controller involvement by more adequate questions, related with the specific subjects of operating and strategic decisions, would probably lead to other variables and therefore improve the insights of the degree of CIM of BU controllers. 
